By Andy Frombolton

In 2019 the ECB launched its action plan for Transforming Women and Girls cricket “underpinned by [2 years of] robust research and consultation”. Central to professionalising elite women’s domestic cricket was a new [8 team] regional structure built on “collaborative cross-County working”. “Each region,” it was stated, “will have its own identity, allowing cricket fans in the region the opportunity to support their local women’s team.”

The plan reassuringly added: “It won’t signal the end of an individual County’s relevance” – although how the ECB had the confidence to make this statement is unclear since it subsequently starved county cricket of funds and deemed it so irrelevant in the exciting world of regional cricket and The Hundred that it wouldn’t even organise proper national T20 and 50 over competitions. Fortunately for the ECB the dedication and determination of a small cadre of dedicated individuals at those counties not hosting a region ensured that women’s county cricket didn’t wither away.

The 2019 Action Plan did caveat: “[This] it is not the destination. …[W]e will continue to evaluate the structure” … and … “potentially the number of regional teams”.

And so here we are, just 4 years later, with the ‘WOMEN’S PROFESSIONAL GAME STRUCTURE 2.0’ – and, guess what, those unloved Counties are back. Why? Because apparently a regional structure doesn’t provide “strong and clear ownership or accountability” nor “provide stability and a sense of belonging for the women’s teams and female players” (which is somewhat at odds with the numerous statements from many players in the past few days saying how upset they are about the break up of the current regional structure).

John Maynard Keynes said: “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?” But what has changed? The ITT argues there are “some significant challenges inherent to the underpinning delivery structure” which are “now prohibitive to future growth”. Or, put another way, the ECB is saying that 2 years of [* refers to the ECB’s list*] desk research, consultation, primary research and engagement with primary stakeholders and subject matter experts culminated in a structure which within 4 years is apparently incapable of accommodating the very growth or fan loyalty that it sought to deliver?

Exactly when did this realisation come to the ECB isn’t clear but the ITT states that it is the result of 6 months of consultation, so let’s assume early 2023. Working back from a self-imposed deadline that all the changes would be in place for the 2025 season enforced an accelerated tender and selection process which started (formally) with a tender document at the end of January and the selection of winning bids less than 3 months later. That’s less than ten weeks for parties to decide whether to bid, develop proposals and make a pitch to the ECB.

As it us, the fans and supporters, who are ultimately paying for it, we should expect the rationale to be explained and for the selection process to be professionally-managed and transparent.

Recap. The Project Darwin Invitation-to-Tender (ITT)

It’s obviously imperative that what comes next is well-thought-out, robust and flexible enough to accommodate whatever happens not just in the next 4 years, but across the next decade. What was the envisaged structure?

1. The ITT defined the criteria and timeline which would be used to select those counties to be granted Tier 1 status for the period 2025-2028.
   
2. The ITT was also specific about the number of Tier 1 counties – eight – and stated that Tiers 1, 2 and 3 would be closed, i.e. no promotion or relegation, for at least the first 4 years. Beyond this period the ITT referenced the possibility of promotion and relegation, i.e. the elevation and demotion of (the same number of) teams between divisions, which is fundamentally distinct from ‘expansion’ (where the number of teams in a league or division grows).
   
3. The ITT was very clear that achieving a geographically-even distribution of the 8 proposed Tier 1 counties would be paramount in any decision.
   
   This would mean that if, for instance, Kent submitted the best proposal of all the bidders, there could be no prospect that any of the adjacent counties (Sussex, Middlesex or Essex) would also be awarded Tier 1 status even if theirs was objectively the 2^nd best bid.

4. When the ITT was issued, two key documents (the County Partnership Agreement 2025-2028) and the Venue Agreement weren’t even finalised. I stated at the time this pointed to a rushed and ill-conceived bid process – although it is only now becoming clear just how embryonic the ECB’s thinking was.

What’s just been announced?

Many people worried that the bid process might be a charade and that the end result would simply see the current regional hosts re-appointed.

Then came the first media leak – Durham had beaten Yorkshire (Northern Diamonds), Essex had beaten Middlesex (Sunrisers) and Somerset had beaten Gloucester (Western Storm).

It looked like the ECB had made some radical selections and that regional incumbency had not been any guarantee of success.

… But then came the official announcement and swiftly it became apparent that all was not quite as it seemed.

For the ECB had deviated significantly from the ITT against which the counties bid.

1. Yes, there would initially be 8 Tier 1 counties.
   
2. But two years later, 2 more anointed counties (Yorkshire and Glamorgan) would be added …
   
   … regardless of their performances and results in 2024 and 2025.

And, in the interim these 2 counties would receive new additional funding to help them prepare.

3. And the ECB’s intention is to add 2 more teams (selection criteria TBC) in 2029.
   

Together these changes represent significant and fundamental changes to the selection process and to the structure of the game as presented in the ITT.

The ECB’s explanation

The ECB’s justified these changes as follows: “The decision to select two additional Counties – Glamorgan and Yorkshire – as the ninth and tenth Tier 1 Clubs by 2027, and our stated aim to move to 12 teams in Tier 1 by 2029, is testament to the strength of the bids and the pace at which we all want to move to effect change.”

Professional and transparent?

In any commercial tender situation, the most basic expectation of any bidder is that key terms or conditions are fixed since these form the basis upon which a party will decide whether or not to bid and to make forecasts about likely investments and returns.

However, the ECB made numerous changes which constitute material revisions to the terms and conditions.

• Thought you were getting a 4 year (minimum) regional ‘monopoly’? Sorry! The ECB has decided to add 2 additional Tier 1 counties from 2027. Apologies if that totally undermines your business case or the rationale for bidding. (The Essex Chairman has admitted that expansion “wasn’t really talked about” until the winning bids were announced.)
  
• And since we didn’t mention the first expansion, bidders will have been similarly surprised by the goal of adding 2 more counties in 2029 (the timing and criteria for elevation both TBC). Sorry again!
  
• Does this mean you’ve abandoned the idea of promotion and relegation? Did we really propose that? We’ll get back to you.
  
• Just checking – winning bidders will receive £1.3m in the first year? And successful counties will be expected to contribute at least (an estimated) £400k a year towards the cost of hosting a Tier 1 team. No, we’ve decided to raise the funding to £1.5m. Surely a trifling £200k less contribution per annum wouldn’t have made that much difference to any county with tight finances?
  
• Apologies, that we didn’t mention the alternative option of being one of two further teams to be elevated in 2027 nor that in those intervening 2 years those 2 counties will be allocated extra money to prepare themselves for their promotion. So, whilst the original 8 will have spent at least £400k of their money during the first two years the next 2 counties will have been recipients of extra ECB funding. We can’t envisage how this might have changed any county’s bidding strategy – notwithstanding that this difference equates to some club’s entire annual profit last year.
  
• Remember how the ITT prioritised the regionally-distribution of Tier 1 counties over all other factors? Well, maybe we should have explained that this only applied to the first 2 years? After that time, we can add new Tier 1 teams wherever in the country we want – even if that totally undermines your planned fan base, your access to talent and the commercial value attributable to having a regional monopoly.
  

[Had the selection panel been tasked to identify 9 dispersed Tier 1 counties in England (plus Glamorgan), not 8 as now, from Day 1 this would unquestionably have generated different regional permutations and would not have seen 2 adjacent counties secure Tier 1 status.]

[Given the precedent that a new entrant can be a neighbour of an existing Tier 1 county, presumably the ECB will have no issue if e.g. Gloucester is one of the teams most warranting promotion in 2029 despite the resultant regional concentration of Glamorgan, Gloucester and Somerset? Ditto Worcester creating a Glamorgan, Worcester and Warwickshire ‘block’. What if both Gloucester and Worcester earned promotion? Similarly Kent and Sussex?]

I’m really unhappy with the way the ECB has run this tender!

Bidders might have hoped for an independent appeals process, but the ITT looks like it copied the terms for a competition on the side of a crisp packet to win a holiday.

Section 5.6: “The ECB Board is the only entity empowered to award Tier 1 women’s team status and its decision on such awards shall be final. The ECB Board shall have no obligation to give any reasons for its decisions or to enter into any correspondence or other communications in relation to its decisions.”

The link between having a Tier 1 team and securing a future Hundred franchise

Finally, it’s been widely suggested that by being awarded a Tier 1 team Somerset and Durham are guaranteed to get a Hundred franchise in the future.

I offer 3 observations:

1. If so, why doesn’t the same argument apply with respect to Essex?
   
2. Having a women’s franchise (Western Storm) didn’t secure Gloucestershire a Hundred franchise the first time around.
   
   Politics trumped Equality and the franchise went to Cardiff/Glamorgan.
   
3. The ECB is currently looking for private investment in The Hundred teams. Regardless of what anyone says, if / when the Hundred competition is expanded the ‘Number 1’ criteria for awarding additional franchises will be their attractiveness to investors.
   
   Ultimately investors won’t care about the geographic-distribution of women’s franchises or a specific county’s commitment to equality, they will purely be interested in the ability to create and monetise a brand. If that means a third London (men’s and women’s) franchise is viewed as more valuable than one based in Durham, that’s what will happen. Similarly, if a Bristol-based franchise is deemed more desirable than a Taunton-based one, that too is what will happen.
   
   Money will trump Equality.
   

By Andy Frombolton

The ECB has recently sent an Invitation To Tender (ITT) to all 18 men’s First Class Counties (FCC) plus MCC seeking expressions of interest in becoming one of 8 proposed Tier 1 (premier) women’s cricket counties.

In several places, the ITT refers to the idea of there being relegation and promotion after the initial 4-year period.

This article explains how it would be almost unworkable in practice and disastrous in reality; requiring teams to prioritise survival over talent development, pushing talent towards the teams deemed safest from relegation, and potentially deterring FCCs from bidding for Tier 1 status.

Starting with the basics, what would be the methodology for determining the Tier 1 team to be relegated? Very easy if the same team came bottom of both competitions, but what if the same team won the T20 competition and came last in the 50-over competition? What if a team’s results had been significantly impacted by injuries to key players or England call-ups or even by weather? (Remembering the 2021 Men’s T20 Blast where Sussex had 5 games rained off whereas no northern team lost more than 1 game to weather.) Relegation wouldn’t be like going from Division 1 to Division 2 in the Men’s County Championship, it would be brutal and binary (going from professional to amateur).

Obviously, the same question applies in respect of the team to be promoted. With 10 (or possibly 11) FCCs playing in Tier 2 it’s even less likely that the same team would win most competitions.

But let’s imagine that a methodology was developed to determine the teams to be relegated and promoted …

At the macro level, the geographic spread of Tier 1 teams (which the ITT stresses will be an overarching goal in the initial selection of successful bidders) could swiftly be distorted or rapidly dismantled. To illustrate the point, imagine the first team to be relegated was the North East / ‘Yorkshire’ team and the promoted county was located in the South East. The following year, the North West / ‘Lancashire’ team is relegated and, again, the promoted team is from the South East. Suddenly, there’s no Tier 1 cricket north of the Midlands, and a huge concentration of Tier 1 counties in the South East.

The situation is even messier at the micro level …

The relegated team would need to release all its contracted players (paying compensation to those in the middle of multi-year contracts) as well as associated coaching and support staff. Players with local commitments, mortgages, etc. might not be able to move and could swiftly run into financial difficulties. The relegated club may also have developed resources or facilities for the women’s team which they can no longer afford or which are now surplus to requirements. To mitigate this financial risk, counties would be forced to only offer 1 year rolling contracts to their players and staff – which is hardly conducive to persuading women that good careers exist in cricket and certainly not allowing them to plan their futures with any confidence.

And, if the audience and demand for the women’s game has grown as hoped, the relegated team will have played its part in this success (both in terms of providing an entertaining product and investing their own money in the team). Their reward? Expulsion at the very time when the game should be moving to a sustainable footing and some of their sunk costs might be recovered?

For the promoted team, the reward for most, and possibly all, of the amateur players who were responsible for securing the promotion would be to lose their county places, since the newly-promoted team will need to rapidly migrate to a fully-professional squad ready to compete the following season. A few of the victors might pick up professional contracts on the back of their performances, but the rest would need to move to another Tier 2 county (or perhaps might just choose to leave the game). (This is a serious issue – the ITT would create a situation where the most talented amateur players in 10 counties would be denied the chance to play for their county.)

The promoted club would then have the off-season to negotiate a funding agreement (assuming acceptable terms can be agreed) and sign a venue agreement with the ECB, wherafter it would need to recruit a full squad and support staff from scratch. A wholesale novation of staff from the relegated club isn’t realistic – the promoted team might not want (or might not be able to afford) certain players or support staff, and conversely the impacted players and staff might not want (or be able) to move to a new location. The only other source of players would be the county’s existing amateurs (who may not aspire to be professional cricketers) and out-of-contract or released players; collectively this might allow you to assemble a team, but not necessarily one with a good chance of not being relegated at the end of the following season.

These issues might easily be enough to deter possible bidders, but if they didn’t, they would certainly promote short-termism in player recruitment and a disincentive to invest in developing young talent. If the primary motivation becomes survival, a team’s outlook becomes myopic.

Within the chosen Tier 1 counties, it is almost certain that there will be significant differences in their respective spending power. Many of the best players would gravitate towards the richer counties, which could offer them more in the way of support and facilities (and perhaps better out-of-season overseas opportunities if their coaches are well connected). So, although money isn’t a guarantee of on-field success, it makes it more likely that the battle to avoid relegation wouldn’t be an 8-way battle but one fought out between the 3-4 smaller clubs.

For all these reasons, the idea of promotion and relegation needs to be abandoned. 

Players could then commit to teams with confidence and counties could afford to take a longer-term view towards the time when the women’s game achieves a self-sufficient and sustainable basis. 

The ECB could still reserve the right to terminate a county’s Tier 1 status if it failed to meet specified metrics in terms of player support, delivery of pathway programmes or required support to adjacent counties; much like a school being put in special measures, either installing their own management and staff, or (where this was viable) finding an adjacent FCC willing to take on the role.

And, Tier 2 teams which consistently produce a disproportionate number of players who go on to secure Tier 1 contracts could be rewarded with a bigger share of the funds provided to this level, thereby allowing them to invest in their local pathway and be well placed to make a bid for Tier 1 status if the number of clubs was ever increased.

By Andy Frombolton

The ECB’s recent announcement of equal match fees for the England women’s team was widely welcomed as a positive step towards genuine reward parity.

The accompanying statements focussed on principles of equality / morality, and the purpose of this article is not to question this rationale, but to consider some possible consequences.

Absent investors with a long-term viewpoint (e.g., the original IPL franchisees), the fundamental concept that the total amount which any sport can pay its players / officials will be capped by the revenue it generates is both obvious and uncontentious (hence footballers earn more than cricketers who earn more than netball players who earn more than shot-putters) i.e., popularity determines pay. It could be argued therefore that it is dissonant to subsequently argue that within a particular sport male and female players should be paid equally, i.e., reward need not be linked to the value which the same free market assigns to each team’s respective endeavours. The principal counter argument is that the women’s game has been denied the opportunity to develop its own revenue stream (recognising that it is pure conjecture what the potential market might be).

The ECB’s statement acknowledged that the ‘investment’ [i.e., higher fees] is made “ahead of revenues” or, to be more blunt, the additional expenditure must come from the ECB’s existing revenue streams. TV deals – the major source of income – are fixed until the end of 2028 for domestic games and 2031 for ICC events and the value of Metro Bank’s ‘long term’ sponsorship of women’s cricket was agreed before this announcement. Ticket price sensitivity for the women’s game is not well understood and there has to be a concern that higher prices could adversely impact the excellent progress in increasing attendances suggesting that there is limited scope for increasing gate receipts in the short term. 

So, if there’s no more money overall, then paying increased match fees now (whilst also gradually increasing base salaries) must necessitate cuts elsewhere. But to what? The ECB has remained silent on this matter. Cuts to the ECB’s staff? Cuts to marketing budgets? Cuts to coaching? Cuts to the support it provides to grass roots cricket? Or cuts to the women’s game beneath the professional level (as if the vital county game could be less loved)? There will be immediate and ongoing consequences.

However, these risks are dwarfed by the implications of implementing a reward structure which is primarily driven by legal principles of equality. At which point we need to go back to 2012 to consider the (seemingly-unrelated) story concerning Birmingham council mentioned in the article’s title. To recap, the council was taken to court by female employees claiming sex discrimination in respect of pay (simplistically, the council paid male workers, such as refuse collectors, different bonuses to female workers, such as care assistants or cleaners, despite them being employed on the same grade). N.B. This is not to directly equate this situation to male and female cricketers in terms of their respective skills nor to argue that the Birmingham decision was wrong, but to look at what happened next. 

Firstly, expert legal advice had been that backdated claims could only be made within 6 months, but the Supreme Court unexpectedly ruled 6 years. Secondly, although the original claim was made by just 175 women, the ruling extended to anyone in the same position. Subsequently, tens of thousands of new claimants came forward. Despite having already paid out over a billion pounds in claims the council’s current equal pay liability is estimated to be in the region of £650-760m (a sum equivalent to its annual budget) and a few weeks ago it issued at Section 114 notice (akin to becoming bankrupt) principally, although not entirely, due to its inability to meet its liabilities for equal pay. The consequences for Birmingham residents in respect of any non-mandatory services will be rapid and brutal.

Returning to cricket, no former women England cricketers have announced a claim for back pay – but there’s probably a lawyer ready to argue the case. The ECB, having equalised match fees, has also announced a timetable to equalise base salaries, but these timings might easily be forced by events outside of their control in other sports. For instance, the Scottish Football Association (SFA) has just settled a claim with its women’s team regarding equal pay and equivalent benefits to the men in respect of training facilities, hotels and travel, kit, medical and nutritional resources. 

Had the case gone ahead and been lost by the SFA, a legal precedent would have been set that would have had wide-ranging consequences for all sports. In the subsequent press announcements by the Chief Executive there were also interesting allusions to the claimants having possibly accepted elements of the reward/revenue argument: “We must now look forward with a shared goal: to return to major tournaments, working together to bring success on the field that will in turn encourage broadcasters and rights holders to do more to bridge the value gap that remains the biggest obstacle on the journey to equality within the women’s game globally.”

The issue is that the ECB’s position hasn’t settled the debate, it’s catalysed it. Which other groups else might have a claim? Equality legislation doesn’t just cover sex, it also covers other characteristics such as disability and age, so the same arguments which have been powerfully deployed to underpin the women’s claim must surely also apply to the disability teams (since they too have ECB contracts)? But why not also to the various age teams? (They don’t have contracts, but is this ageist?) The potential list is a long one. 

Where will the money come from then?

It would have been possible to design a reward structure which provided equality in those key non-pay areas covered by the SFA claim and gave commitments regarding promotion and marketing of the women’s game, but also included a (significant) element of reward being based on market-determined value. (Pending the time when tv rights and sponsorship can be marketed and sold separately there are objective ways of calculating a fair revenue split.). Such an arrangement would have ensured that the ECB’s total pay and reward bill was managed, but this opportunity has now passed.

The clear end state must be that the women’s game has control (and also responsibility) for its destiny. Player reward would then be an issue for the women’s game alone – determined not by seeking an equitable share of a pooled pot but by the realities of stand-alone revenue generation. As I’ve noted in previous articles, no one can know what this might look like although any comparisons with pay and reward in the men’s game would be moot (although initial baseline (quantum) expectations will have been set by the current ECB deal).

‘Equality of opportunity’ is something which everyone should be able to agree on, but similarly everyone needs to recognise that it’s not the same as ‘equality of outcome’. 

The ECB seems to have implemented a policy without adequately consideration as to how to control it. The danger illustrated by the Birmingham situation is that what begins as a contained, fair and reasonable argument can, and in this instance is quite likely to, spiral in unpredictable and exponential directions; each new claim building on the last. 

The players might be happy, the PCA might be happy, fans of equality might be happy. But will this victory be both fleeting and pyrrhic? For the sake of the game we all love, let’s hope not.

By Andy Frombolton

As Sun Tzu notes in ‘The Art of War’: “A military force has no constant formation, water has no constant shape. The ability to gain victory by changing and adapting according to the opponent is called genius.”

Hence for England to have any chance in the forthcoming Women’s Ashes, team selection needs to take account of the very different skills required across the 3 formats.

Playing against a formidable opposition can bring out the best in some players; whilst for others it exposes their limits. Compare these 2 tables. (Green colouring indicates improved stats compared to performances against all other teams; red means the opposite.)

With the exception of Healy in T20s and McGrath in ODIs, the best Australian players maintain or improve their performances when playing their biggest rivals, England. (Perry’s ‘underperformance’ in ODIs means her performances against England have merely been ‘very good’, not ‘exceptional’.)

Already however the England contracted players are being incrementally withdrawn from the CEC in order to prepare for the Women’s Ashes – notwithstanding that many have looked considerably undercooked in their outings and could benefit from more competitive match practice – indicating that England plans to select their various squads from this cohort over the coming contest.

Quite simply however, England cannot afford to field teams containing players whose limitations have been brutally exposed by this all-vanquishing opposition. To do so, and expect better results than last time, would be madness.

This isn’t to advocate a wholesale replacement of the centrally-contracted cohort, but – particularly in the T20 format – many lack the 360-degree batting skills, fielding agility or bowling variations which the modern game requires.

Instead, what could be achieved by a team comprising the best of the central cohort and an influx of players unburdened by past failures and inspired by an unexpected call up? (And if this team loses? There’s no more points of offer for the magnitude of a win or loss!)

This would necessitate some difficult conversations and some potentially-embarrassing outcomes if centrally-contracted players aren’t picked, but Jon Lewis has already demonstrated that he isn’t going to be bound by the decisions or selection choices of his predecessors. Nor should he feel uncomfortable if he has to go outside of the England contracted players to assemble what he deems to be his best team. This is about trying to win the Women’s Ashes, not individual egos.

Based on performances so far this year, Bess Heath, Bryony Smith, Katie Levick, Danni Gibson and Holly Armitage need to be told that if they continue to perform over the next few weeks then an England call-up awaits.